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Israel’s rates of organ donation have been one of the lowest among developed 
countries. An attempt to change this has led to the introduction of a pioneering 
new law, the Organ Transplant Act 2008, which came into effect in January 
2010 and sets out principles underlying a new policy in relation to the 
allocation of organs for transplantation. According to this policy, a person can 
gain priority points by signing a donor card, making a non-directed organ 
donation during their life, or as a result of a first degree relative signing a 
donor card or consenting to procurement of organs after death. In this opinion 
piece, we argue that while this approach merits attention for its innovative 
aspects and its potential benefits, it raises some ethical difficulties. In 
particular we discuss some problems of justice and fairness inherent in the 
system, focusing on inequalities due to the number of relatives one might have, 
due to the type of living donation one makes, the potential for strategic 
behaviour, and problems regarding the consent of family members.  
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Israel’s rates of organ donation have been one of the lowest among developed 
countries. It has achieved a consistently low rate of cadaveric donations over 
the last 10 years, reaching 9.8 pmp at its highest to 6.4 pmp at its lowest (1). 
These low rates should be understood on the backdrop of various cultural and 
religious concerns and beliefs held by some in the Jewish community.(2) 
Although organ donation is permitted and encouraged by all denominations of 
modern Judaism and is even considered a meritorious act (mitzvah) by the 
many influential rabbinical scholars today,(3) some still hold the erroneous 
opinion that Judaism objects to the definition of brain death. To fight against 
this perception, the Israeli donor card allows the donor to stipulate that a 
clergyman chosen by the family should give approval prior to retrieving 
organs. Others hold superstitious beliefs that consent to donation might invoke 
bad luck (an ‘evil eye’) and bring about premature death. Educational 
campaigns to counteract such beliefs have been carried out repeatedly, but with 
limited success. Consent for donation remains disturbingly low. Surveys 
carried out in Israel have shown that priority points would be the most effective 
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incentive to increase willingness to donate, compared – for example - with 
direct financial compensation.(4) 
To examine ways of increasing organ donation, the Israeli National 
Transplant Council (INTC) established a committee of stakeholders and 
relevant experts to give recommendations. The committee included transplant 
physicians and coordinators, lawyers, philosophers, ethicists and 
representatives of the main religions. The discussions of the committee resulted 
in a new law, the Organ Transplant Act 2008, which governs a range of 
activities in relation to both deceased and living donation that came into effect 
in January 2010.(5) Within the new law, a pioneering priority point system is 
introduced, intended to motivate individuals to sign donor cards or to consent 
to donations of the organs of deceased first degree relatives. The latter is of 
great importance since the Israeli approach to organ donation is based on an 
opt-in system in which the consent of first-degree relatives is obtained in 
practice even when the deceased has signed a donor card.(6) While a variety of 
incentives for organ donation, including the allocation of bonus priority points, 
have been considered elsewhere (7-10), Israel is the first country to implement 
a system which incorporates these.
1 
This recent implementation provides a 
timely opportunity to consider some ethical considerations arising from the 
new system.  
The Israeli Act does not enshrine the details of a priority points system 
into statute but rather sets them out at a policy level.(11) Section 9(b)4 of the 
Act authorises the Steering Committee for the National Transplant Center to 
“draw up directives in the matter of the allocation of organs”.(5) When drawing 
up these directives, the Act stipulates that the Committee must take into 
account consent to post-mortem donation given during a person’s lifetime, 
actual deceased donations of first degree relatives, and undirected living 
donations.(5) It is on the basis of these statutory provisions that the new 
scheme has been devised based on a tiered system of priority that includes: 
maximum priority; regular priority, and second priority.(11) Maximum priority 
is granted to candidates if: (a) consent has been given for organ donation from 
a deceased first-degree relative or (b) they donated a kidney, a liver lobe, or a 
lung lobe in the course of their life to a non-specified recipient. Regular 
priority is granted to candidates who hold a donor card, i.e. those who have 
consented to donate their organs after their death. Second priority is granted to 
candidates with a first degree relative who holds a donor card, even if they do 
not hold a donor card themselves. The rationale behind this principle is that in 
the past, Israelis who signed a card have systematically consented to donate the 
organs of a first-degree relative after death, even if the deceased herself did not 
sign a card. We should note, however, that priority points are given for only 
one relative and cannot be accumulated if more than one relative has signed a 
donor card. 
Hence, potential donors and their first degree relatives receive priority 
points should they need an organ. Those who already hold an organ donor card 
or who sign up for one prior to 31 December 2011 will be entitled to their 
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priority points after a waiting period of one year and those who sign up after 
that date will be eligible after a waiting period of three years.(12) In relation to 
living donation, those who direct their organ to a particular recipient receive no 
priority, whilst those who donate to an unspecified recipient receive maximum 
priority points should they ever need an organ. Points cannot be accumulated if 
an individual falls under more than one criterion. In such a case, the highest 
number of points obtained through any one criterion prevails. Thus the points 
system acts as a tie breaker in allocating an organ to patients of equal medical 
need. 
Organs are generally considered a scarce societal resource. Justice and 
fairness require that those who are willing to accept an organ would be willing 
to donate one as well. The new Israeli priority point system rewards those who 
are willing to donate an organ with an increased chance of receiving one. (13) 
In doing so, it is meant to rectify what is perceived as the unfairness of ‘free-
riders’ – those who refuse to donate for religious (or other) reasons, but yet are 
willing to receive an organ when they need one (13). However, a few elements 
of the new system raise ethical concerns. This paper describes these concerns 
and proposes ways to address them in order to improve the system.  
 
Number of First-Degree Relatives 
Israel has a family refusal rate of 50.8%.(14) Attempting to improve this figure, 
the new priority points system allows first degree relatives to gain maximum 
priority points when they consent to the donation of a deceased relative’s 
organs. However, this provision means that one’s chances of obtaining priority 
points depend on how many first degree relatives a person has. Moreover, the 
new system gives second priority to first degree relatives of a potential donor 
(an individual who has signed a donor card). This potentially disadvantages 
those with fewer siblings. If a person has not signed a donor card, but has one 
or more siblings who have done so, they would receive priority points, whereas 
someone without siblings has no such safety net. As such, the system gives a 
comparative advantage to those who have (more) siblings, something which is 
beyond a person’s control. This aspect of the allocation system thus involves 
an element of unfairness.  
This unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that the more siblings one has, 
the greater the likelihood of finding a living donor, as there is more chance that 
one of the siblings will be a compatible match and a willing volunteer. 
Therefore, those with larger families may be less likely to need an organ from a 
deceased donor. Conversely, those with fewer potential living donors are the 
ones most likely to be in need of a deceased organ, but within the new system 






One response to this concern is that regardless of the number of relatives 
a person has “anyone is welcome to sign their own donor card, thereby 
ensuring themselves priority in organ allocation.”(15) While this is 
undoubtedly true, it misses the ethical nub of the matter. The pertinent point is 
not whether individuals should benefit from their own good actions, i.e. signing 
their own donor card, but whether they should benefit from the good actions of 
others where they themselves have not signed a donor card.  
 
Living Donors 
The new Israeli system treats directed living donors differently from those who 
donate to an unspecified recipient,(16) the former being excluded from 
receiving priority points. This is in stark contrast to some Western countries 
where the only people who are privileged in the allocation of organs are 
children and previous living kidney donors. For example, the United Network 
of Organ Sharing (UNOS) uses a points system for the allocation of kidneys 
where previous living kidney donors are awarded extra points.(17)  
Directed living donors assume risk during their lifetime to aid another 
human being. In doing so they shorten the waiting list by one: they help not 
only their recipient, but everyone else waiting for an organ. Organ 
transplantation relies ever increasingly on living donors, yet the Israeli system 
treats previous living donors inequitably. Living donors have already put 
themselves at risk in donating an organ; a morally good act which benefits both 
the recipient and wider society. If we are to allocate organs based on previously 
demonstrated commitment to organ donation, it would seem that a directed 
living donation is more ‘deserving’ than someone who has taken no steps to 
complete a donor card, but whose relative has donated after death or signed a 
donor card. A signed donor card is at best an expression of intent, but is neither 
a morally nor a legally binding contract. Moreover, donation after death cannot 
be equated with the risk and inconvenience of live donation. Indeed, Lavee et 
al acknowledge that this element of the new system is unfair and state that an 
appeal is being prepared to reconsider this element because they “strongly 
believe all living donors should be granted prioritization in organ 
allocation”.(4) 
 
The potential for strategic behaviour 
Within the context of deceased donation the incentive of priority points is 
offered not for the actual organs, but for the promise that they will be made 
available for transplantation after death. This introduces the potential for 
individuals to engage in strategic behaviour. People could join the Israeli 
register solely to guarantee priority points at a later date, whilst instructing their 
families to refuse donation in the event of their death and, thus, expressions of 
willingness to donate may not translate into actual donations. 
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The challenge of translating past expressions of support into actual 
donations is not necessarily new. Countries which operate organ donor 
registries where individuals have to opt-in also experience this obstacle. The 
ethical concern arises where those who express this willingness receive 
something in return; in this case priority points. The problem arises when 
individuals who never intended to donate after death are given preference over 
others when competing for scarce organs. It might be reasonable to assume that 
most people will not engage in this strategic behaviour. There is, however, the 
possibility that a minority might sign up intending to withdraw from the 
register at a later date. Since Israel is the first country to implement a priority 
points system, no empirical evidence exists to date and it is thus difficult to tell 
whether this will happen and to what extent. An assessment will be warranted 
to track changes in the numbers of organs donated and their causes.  
Similar concerns may be raised regarding people in certain potentially 
adverse health states. A person with chronic Hepatitis C, knowing that they are 
at increased risk of liver failure, could join the organ donor register to secure a 
higher place on the waiting list should the need arise. Although it is possible 
that their other organs could be transplanted after death to another person with 
Hepatitis C (of the same viral genotype), due to the much reduced pool of 
possible recipients, it is an unlikely scenario. Thus, this would not result 
necessarily in any extra organs for transplantation. This appears to 
disadvantage others with similar medical needs, who had not taken strategic 
advantage of the system. 
It may be argued that the way around this problem is to exclude those 
groups who are unlikely to ever contribute to the organ pool via a system of 
medical testing and certification of good health. However, such an approach 
presents pragmatic and ethical difficulties. Firstly, besides the cost of testing 
and certification, it might further deter people from joining the register due to 
the time and effort involved. Secondly, such a suggestion seems to present its 
own problem: people most likely to need a transplant due to a foreseeable 
health state would be the ones systematically disadvantaged because they 
would not have access to waiting list prioritisation enjoyed by those who are in 
good health. Thus, whether those individuals in adverse health states were 
permitted to participate in the system or not, there would appear to be ethical 
issues that need to be addressed.(18)   
 
Consent 
Finally, we wish to draw attention to a potential problem regarding consent. 
The transplant community has valued voluntariness in organ donation as an 
expression of respect for the autonomy of individuals. Offering incentives, 
such as priority points, does not necessarily vitiate voluntariness. Instead, they 





about organ donation. However, incentives to donate one’s own organs are 
different from incentives to donate the organs of others. Therefore, the case 
where a person signs up to become an organ donor is to be contrasted with the 
situation where an individual’s wishes were unrecorded and the family is asked 
to make the decision after death. In Israel there has never been a known case in 
which family members consented to organ procurement against the known 
wishes of the deceased. Prevailing cultural norms have hitherto underpinned 
the acceptance of individuals’ wishes regarding the use of their organs 
postmortem as a part of their will and such wishes are not violated by family 
members.(19) Yet by offering extra priority points to first degree relatives of 
deceased donors, the new Israeli system gives families an incentive to donate a 
loved one’s organs even if the deceased’s wishes for donation are unknown or 
against donation. Consequently, giving the family extra motivation to donate 




Israel’s new Organ Transplantation Act has enabled a unique system to be 
introduced in order to motivate individuals to donate their organs. 
Commendably, it goes some way to addressing the challenge posed by those 
who are willing to accept an organ, but are not willing to donate. Indeed, in 
2011 Israel saw an unprecedented increase in consent for donations (from 49% 
to 55%, with a record number of 70,000 individuals signing donor cards) and 
in actual transplantations (an increase of 68%).(20) While the new system may 
not provide a comprehensive solution to the organ shortage in Israel, these data 
show that the campaign surrounding its introduction has already been 
successful in improving the situation. Some cultural barriers to donation that 
currently exist in Israeli society will still have to be addressed by additional 
campaigns and by an ongoing effort to educate the public, in particular by 
engaging religious authorities and guaranteeing their support and endorsement 
and by enhancing public trust in the healthcare system.(6)  
Nonetheless, the law and the consequent organ donation policy raise 
some challenging ethical questions. Our own discussion indicates at least two 
possible changes which could be made. Firstly, since those who make a living 
donation to a specified person take on risk for the benefit of another during 
their lifetime, they ought to be brought within the purview of the scheme. This 
would reverse the current injustice by appropriately recognising their 
contribution. We would suggest that living donors ought to be given greater 
priority than those who sign a donor card which is at best only an expression of 
willingness; something which might not come to pass. Secondly, it is not clear 
to us why a person should benefit from the actions of their relatives rather than 
their own good deeds. Therefore, we would propose that the allocation of 
priority points be restricted and ought not to include first degree relatives. Such 
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changes would go some way in addressing the justice issues inherent in the 
new system which undermine its ethical integrity. 
The principles underlying the priority points system as set out in the law 
resulted from the deliberations of a committee of experts (including ethics 
experts) that examined the relevant issues. However, when the 
recommendations of the committee were brought before the Labor, Welfare 
and Health Committee of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) that was 
responsible for preparing the law for a final vote, not all of them were 
accepted. For example, the original recommendations of the expert committee 
were to grant priority points only to holders of donor cards and not to their first 
degree relatives and to grant priority points to all live donors whether or not the 
recipients are identified. It is therefore possible that acceptance of expert 
opinion by the legislators could have prevented some of the ethical problems 
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